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of this previously unavailable 1950s 
manuscript, properly seeing contem-
porary United states–China strategic 
relations as his backdrop, has made 
lo’s encyclopedic knowledge available 
to us. However, lo’s book is instruc-
tive beyond that; china as a Sea Power 
is a magisterial contribution to the 
study of world maritime history and 
should be known everywhere by those 
who are interested in that subject.
lo was determined to illuminate China’s 
maritime history to edify his country-
men, who had seen the consequences 
of a lack of naval power. In the first 
decades of lo’s life, foreign navies domi-
nated China’s coastal ports and also 
had wide-ranging rights in other ports 
hundreds of miles up the great rivers. It 
was as if foreign navies could, by right, 
sail at will up the Mississippi from New 
orleans to Minneapolis. the Chinese 
had become accustomed to the seeming 
inevitability of such circumstances and 
knew of the failures to revive Chinese 
naval power at the end of the nineteenth 
century and of Japan’s easy closure of 
China’s ports between 1937 and 1945. It 
was for them that lo wanted to present 
a grand history of Chinese power on 
the sea, and not only naval power but 
seaborne commercial power and the 
urbanization, wealth, and sophistication 
that it had created in great ages past. 
China’s remarkable efflorescence that 
we see today derives from such visions. 
of this book’s many compelling ac-
counts, perhaps the richest is lo’s 
description of the naval campaigns of 
the Mongols, who, as the yuan dynasty, 
ruled China between 1271 and 1368. 
the Mongols, who had no experi-
ence fighting at sea, quickly adapted 
and soon organized armadas built and 
manned by their new Chinese subjects. 
they launched invasions northward 
into the east China sea and southward 
into the south China sea. today’s 
increasingly visible and vocal Chinese 
admirals seem eager to draw inspira-
tion from these huge undertakings, but 
for all the immense capabilities they 
demonstrated, Kublai Khan’s two inva-
sions of Japan and his three invasions 
of vietnam in the thirteenth century 
all ended in disaster. eight centuries 
later, in his November 2012 valedictory 
address, Hu Jintao, China’s outgoing 
president and the Communist Party’s 
general secretary, urged his successors 
“to build China into a maritime power.” 
In this they would be well advised to 
read lo Jung-pang’s account of China’s 
past glories as a sea power, not only as 
inspiration but also as a cautionary tale.
CHarles HorNer 
Senior Fellow, Hudson institute, and author of 
rising China and Its Postmodern fate
tucker, Nancy bernkopf. The china Threat: 
Memories, Myths, and realities in the 1950s. New 
york: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012. 312pp. $39.50
President dwight d. eisenhower is 
remembered in history as a dedicated 
Cold Warrior whose staunch anticom-
munism included commitment to the 
containment and rollback of com-
munism in asia. In The china Threat 
Nancy bernkopf tucker challenges 
this narrative, suggesting that eisen-
hower and secretary of state John foster 
dulles possessed a more nuanced view 
of China than is generally supposed. 
tucker is an established and respected 
historian of U.s. policy toward China 
whose earlier works include a study 
of U.s.-Chinese relations during the 
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second Harry truman administration. 
In this work, she soundly establishes 
that eisenhower and dulles did not 
view the communist world as a mono-
lith. In contrast to many american 
observers, eisenhower concluded that 
Mao’s control of China was a perma-
nent fact and that U.s. rollback of the 
Chinese communist revolution was 
unlikely. like truman before him, he 
disparaged Chinese Nationalist leader 
Chiang Kai-shek and his unrealistic 
hopes for reestablishing himself on 
the mainland. eisenhower and dulles 
believed that Mao could create his 
own path within international com-
munism, following the independent 
path of yugoslavia’s Josip broz tito. In 
this view they anticipated the possibil-
ity of a sino-soviet split before it came 
to pass. they viewed U.s. economic 
sanctions against China as counterpro-
ductive, strengthening ties between the 
communist-bloc nations. yet despite 
these assessments, eisenhower contin-
ued on a course of confrontation with 
China, conducting covert operations 
and propaganda against China, tying 
taiwan into a mutual-defense treaty, 
and enforcing economic sanctions 
against the mainland. tucker thus faces 
the task of explaining an eisenhower 
who “disparaged much of what passed 
for China policy under his own admin-
istration” yet never publicly expressed or 
substantially acted on his convictions. 
eisenhower and dulles both saw U.s. 
interests in asia as secondary to those 
in europe. both had strong personal 
ties to the european allies and to Nato 
and were convinced that europe was 
america’s enduring partner and the 
key arena for arresting communist 
expansion. Changing U.s.-China policy 
carried the probability of significant 
political cost. because the republican 
Party had made truman’s “loss of Chi-
na” a central issue in the 1952 campaign, 
moderating the U.s. approach would 
have required eisenhower to challenge 
both his own party and the influential 
anticommunist “China lobby.” Politi-
cal capital expended on China policy 
would come at the expense of essential 
support for european efforts—a cost 
eisenhower was not willing to pay. 
In the end, the fact that eisenhower 
and dulles had a less hard-line view of 
U.s. relations with China than is com-
monly assessed becomes a case study 
in the use and limitation of presidential 
power. the subtleties of eisenhower’s 
view of asia pointed to constraints 
on his action, real and perceived, and 
made the cost of a potential change 
in U.s. policy more than eisenhower 
was willing to bear. as tucker con-
cludes, in the end eisenhower did not 
get the China policy he wanted, but 
he did get the China policy he made.
CoMMaNder dale C. rIelage, UsN
strachan, Hew, and sibylle scheipers, eds. The 
changing character of war. New york: oxford 
Univ. Press, 2011. 564pp. $110
academic strategists have been agoniz-
ing over whether war is changing its 
character or is being changed by any 
manner of influences, ranging from 
technology to “war amongst the people,” 
since the fall of the soviet Union. the 
tragedy of september 11th added 
impetus to this inquiry. the oxford 
leverhulme Changing Character of 
War program, which ran from 2003 
to 2009, has been to date the most 
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